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In recent years some of the nation’s largest corporations have been
the object of fierce takeover battles. The effects of these battles for corpo-
rate control reach far beyond the board room. Many stand to gain or lose
depending upon the outcome. Shareholders and employees, suppliers,
creditors, competitors and state and local governments all have an inter-
est in these struggles. In addition, the success of bidders in carrying out
takeovers and of companies in resisting sends signals to management of
other companies about their susceptibility to a takeover. It is not surpris-
ing, then, that both takeover attempts and the tactics used to thwart
them have become subjects of intense controversy. A number of states
have recently enacted regulations to delay and discourage takeovers,
while federal legislators are considering limitations on both takeovers
and takeover defenses. This paper examines the nature of the takeover
controversy and some of the arguments in favor of restricting takeovers.
In particular, it considers whether acquisition attempts distinguished by
the opposition of target company management require more stringent
regulation than acquisitions that have target management approval.
The conclusion of the paper is that legislation restricting hostile
takeovers is not warranted. Shareholders of hostile takeover targets en-
joy substantial increases in the prices of their shares as a result of take-
over attempts. These increases are as large as, if not larger than, the
increases resulting from acquisitions that have target management’s ap-
proval. Those who would restrict hostile takeovers on the grounds of
protecting target company shareholders have little empirical support.
On the other hand, the view that hostile takeovers are attempts to
remove entrenched, incompetent management also receives little sup-
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port. Various accounting measures indicate that targets of hostile take-
overs are unremarkable firms, or in consulting jargon neither "dogs" nor
"stars." Since the nature of target management failure is not obvious, the
argument that hostile takeovers exert a useful discipline on managers
generally is not persuasive. At the same time, the unremarkable nature
of hostile takeover targets provides no basis for protecting these firms
and their managements from changes in control.
The first portion of this paper briefly reviews the relationship be-
tween takeovers and other forms of acquisition. The second section
summarizes the arguments for and against takeovers. The paper then
addresses two issues central to this debate: first, what do takeovers
mean for shareholders of the target companies and second, are targets of
takeovers performing up to their potential. The final section of the paper
draws conclusions.
Mergers and Takeovers
In the past 100 years there have been four major merger "booms:"
the consolidations of numerous firms in the same industry into industry
giants in the 1890s and early 1900s; the large combinations of electric and
gas utilities, as well as other types of mergers, in the 1920s; the conglom-
erate mergers of the 1960s; and the current merger boom, which began
in the late 1970s.~ In all three of the earlier booms, perceived abuses
resulted in legislationregulating merger and acquisition activities. Regu-
lations at the turn of the century focused on the anticompetitive effects
of mergers, with fears of monopolization leading to the Sherman Anti-
trust Act (1890) and later to the Clayton and Federal Trade Commission
Acts (1914). The regulatory response to the mergers of the 1920s was
directed to ensuring that shareholders had sufficiently accurate informa-
tion to make decisions about merger and acquisition proposals as well as
other corporate matters; the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 estab-
lished disclosure requirements and otherwise regulated the issuance of
securities and related promotional activities. In the 1960s, concern over
hostile tender offers led to the passage of the Williams Act in 1968; this
Act and accompanying regulations extended disclosure requirements to
cash tender offers, which had not previously been covered, and estab-
lished procedural rules for such transactions. Again the justification was
enabling shareholders to make more informed decisions.
The current merger boom is also generating a regulatory response.
1 Scherer (1980) and The W.T. Grimm & Co., Mergerstat Review 1986, p. 3. Grimm also
identifies a merger wave in the 1940s characterized by the acquisition of many smaller
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Many states have already passed antitakeover legislation.2 Other states,
as well as federal lawmakers, are considering legislation that would
make hostile takeovers more difficult. The model for many of the most
recent legislative proposals is the Control Share Acquisitions Chapter of
the Indiana Business Corporation Law, the legality of which was upheld
by the U.S. Supreme Court in April 1987. Under the Indiana Act, the
acquisition of shares in Indiana corporations above certain thresholds
does not automatically include the voting rights normally associated
with these shares. The transfer of voting rights must be approved by a
majority of shareholders, not including the bidder or inside directors
and officers of the target company. By its requirement of a shareholders’
meeting, the Indiana Act stretches out the time required to consummate
a tender offer and makes the outcome of a hostile offer more uncertain.
The requirement of shareholder approval of voting rights does not apply
if the acquisition is part of a merger agreement, in other words, if it has
the support of the target’s l~anagement and board of directors.
What distinguishes the current regulatory thrust is the focus on
hostile takeovers. As the Indiana Act illustrates, most of the antitake-
over proposals would not affect mergers or other acquisitions supported
by target management. They are directed at hostile takeovers, especially
tender offers opposed by target management. While the Williams Act
was also prompted by hostile tender offers, its effect was to ensure that
the disclosure requirements governing such transactions were compara-
ble to those for other forms of acquisitions. In contrast, current legisla-
tion seems designed to discourage hostile tender offers by making
acquisitions that are opposed by target management more difficult than
those that have its approval.
What Constitutes a Hostile Takeover
Firms can be acquired by merger, purchase of assets, proxy fight, or
tender offer. The method chosen depends upon such factors as the atti-
tude of the target company’s management, taxes on shareholders of
both companies, the time required to complete the acquisition, and costs
of the acquisition. A merger occurs when the boards of directors of.both
companies agree to combine. A vote of the shareholders of the target
company and, sometimes, of the acquiring company is required to con-
summate the merger. Since shareholders generally vote with manage-
ment, the outcome of the vote is usually a foregone conclusion. A
purchase of assets also requires the agreement of target management
and, if a major portion of the firm’s assets is to be purchased, the ap-
2 An article by Robert Lenzner in the Boston Globe, July 9, 1987, counted over 20 states
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proval of target shareholders.
Most bidders seeking to acquire a company would prefer the coop-
eration of the incumbent management. Friendly management is more
likely to disclose "skeletons" that may not appear on financial statements
and to help make the change in c.ontrol go smoothly. Target management
may also be an important asset--one of the reasons the bidder wanted
the company in the first place.
Sometimes, however, a bidder faces opposition from target manage-
ment and sometimes a bidder does not place great value on target man-
agement’s support. Under these circumstances the bidder may bypass
target management and go directly to the shareholders with a tender
offer. In a tender offer, the bidder announces his willingness to purchase
shares of the target company on the open market; to induce sharehold-
ers to sell, a premium over the current market price is usually offered.
Engaging in a proxy fight is also an option for a bidder facing manage-
ment opposition to an acquisition proposal. However, proxy fights,
which are determined by shareholder vote, are difficult to win because
so many shareholders routinely vote with management. They can also
be very expensive. While proxy fights were used in the 1950s, the tender
offer has been the preferred mechanism for making hostile takeovers for
the past 25 years.
Although tender offers are used to accomplish hostile takeovers, by
no means are all tender offers hostile. Since no shareholder meeting is
required, tender offers can be completed quite rapidly. Thus, if time is an
important consideration, a tender offer may be an advantageous means
of effecting a combination even when target management has been in-
volved in the negotiations and supports the transaction.
While not all tender offers are hostile, not all mergers are friendly--
even though mergers require a shareholder vote and shareholders com-
monly vote with management. The fact that a bidder has the option of
resorting to a tender offer if merger discussions break down can lead
target management to acquiesce to mergers that it might otherwise op-
pose. The point is simply that what constitutes a hostile takeover at-
tempt is not always clear-cut. Target management may know one when
it sees one, but the researcher looking at merger and acquisition statistics
may have difficulty. In the following discussion, contested tender offers
are taken to represent hostile takeovers. Tender offers that were not
contested by target management are not considered hostile, even
though they may have been unwelcome.
Hostile Takeovers in the Current Merger Boom
Contested tender offers account for a very small fraction of mergers
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Table 1
Merger and Acquisition Announcements, 1976-86
Privately Publicly
Net Owned Foreign Traded Tender Offersa
Year Announcements Divestitures Sellers Sellers Sellers Total Contested
1976 2,276 1,204 856 53 163 70 18
1977 2,224 1,002 971 58 193 69 10
1978 2,106 820 969 57 260 90 27
1979 2,128 752 1,049 79 248 106 26
1980 1,889 666 988 62 173 53 12
1981 2,395 830 1,330 67 168 75 28
1982 2,346 875 1,222 69 180 68 29
1983 2,533 932 1,316 95 190 37 11
1984 2,543 900 1,351 81 211 79 18
1985 3,001 1,218 1,358 89 336 84 32
1986 3,336 1,259 1,598 93 386 150 40
alncluded in publicly traded sellers.
Source: The W.T. Grimm & Co., Mergerstat Review 1986.
er and acquisition activity. Table 1 compares the pattern of merger and
acquisition announcements by major category over the period from 1976
to 1986. As can be seen from the table, announcements of mergers and
acquisitions rose sharply from 1980, with all categories contributing to
the increase. Total tender offers and contested tender offers more than
doubled between 1976 and 1986, with much of the increase coming in
1986. Even so, tender offers accounted for fewer than 5 percent of total
acquisition announcements in 1986 and contested tender offers just over
1 percent. Why then all the fuss?
One answer is size. Almost half of all acquisitions involve the pur-
chase of privately owned companies. These are generally quite small,
although the size is increasing. According to Mergerstat Review, the aver-
age purchase price in 1986 for those private companies for which such
information was available--presumably the largest--was $40 million. In
contrast, the average purchase price for publicly traded companies,
which include targets of tender offers, was $255 million. The average
purchase price for divestitures, the second largest acquisition category,
was also considerably smaller than the average for publicly traded com-
panies. The larger the company the more people--managers, employ-
ees, investors, suppliers--who might be affected by a change in
ownership and the greater the attention the acquisition will receive in
the press.
Not only are publicly traded companies larger than other acquisi-
tions, but also the targets of tender offers are larger than other publicly
traded targets. Table 2 shows the average market value in 1983 and 1984204 Lynn E. Browne and Eric S. Rosengren
Table 2
Average Market Value in 1983 and 1984 of Companies Trading on the Major
Exchanges That Were Targets of Takeover Attempts in 1985
Number of Average Market Value
Target (Millions of Dollars)
Nature of Attempt Companiesa 1984              1983
All Attempts 133 692.4 (111)b 578.2 (129)b
Tender Offers 49 1532.2 (39) 1139.5 (48)
Uncontested 29 1072.4 (20) 834.0 (29)
Contested 20 2016.2 (19) 1605.9 (19)
Contested, excluding
Refining Companies 17 485.8 (16) 460.9 (16)
Mergers and Other Offers,
Excluding Tenders 84 237.4 (72) 245.5 (81)
Private by Management 23 162.5 (20) 164.4 (22)
Mergers 61 266.3 (52) 275.7 (59)
aTarget companies consist of (1) companies that were removed from the CRSP files in 1985 because they
were acquired in a transaction that appears in the Transactions Roster of either the 1984 or 1985 volumes
of Mergerstat Review and (2) companies appearing in the CRSP files that were targets of unsuccessful
acquisition attempts according to the 1985 volume of Mergerstat Review.
bNumber of companies with data for that year.
Source: CRSP Stock Files, Center for Research in Security Prices, University of Chicago, 1987; Merger-
stat Review, various issues.
of companies trading on the New York or American stock exchanges that
(1) were acquired in 1985 in a transaction reported in Mergerstat Review in
1984 or 1985 or (2) were targets of an unsuccessful acquisition attempt
reported in Mergerstat Review 1985.3 (Limiting the sample to companies
trading on the major exchanges increases the average size.) The compa-
nies are grouped according to whether they were targets of contested
tender offers, uncontested tender offers, acquisitions in which the bid-
ding entity was a private group including company management (pri-
vate by management), and mergers and any other forms of acquisition
(mergers). Companies that were targets of more than one acquisition
attempt in this period are classified according to the initial announce-
ment. Tender offers by company management are considered uncontest-
ed tender offers.
Targets of tender offers were larger than companies taken private by
their management or acquired in mergers. The average market value of
companies that were targets of tender offers was over a billion dollars;
3 More specifically the companies shown in table 2 consist of (1) companies that were
removed from the CRSP files in 1985 because they were acquired in a transaction that
appears in the Transactions Roster of either the 1984 or 1985 volumes of Mergerstat Review
and (2) companies appearing in the CRSP files that were targets of unsuccessful acquisi-
tion attempts according to the 1985 issue of Mergerstat Review. The CRSP Stock Files are
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the average market value of companies targeted in other acquisition
attempts was less than one-quarter of a billion. The average size of tar-
gets of contested tender offers was roughly double that of companies
receiving tender offers that were not contested. Among the contested
group were three refining companies with very large market values; but
even excluding these three, targets of contested tender offers were still
larger than companies that were targets of merger proposals or that
management attempted to take private.
The three refining companies that were targets of contested tender
offers were the only firms in table 2 that were members of this industry.
Since hostile takeovers were so few in number this concentration in a
single industry is striking. However, an examination of acquisition pat-
terns by industry over several years suggests that the usual pattern is
not markedly different for hostile takeovers than for other types of acqui-
sition. Table 3 shows the distribution of offers made from 1983 to 1985 for
companies trading on the major exchanges, according to the industry of
the target company. (Some companies were targets of several acquisition
offers and consequently appear in the table more than once.) As can be
seen, contested tender offers were more concentrated in oil and gas
related activities--exploration and development, refining, utilities--
than acquisitions generally. Contested tender offers were also more con-
centrated in manufacturing and they were relatively infrequent in the
trade and the finance, insurance and real estate industries. However,
the differences do not seem dramatic.
Michael Jensen and others have suggested that hostile takeovers
occur in response to a need for restructuring in an industry, with the oil
industry providing a particularly good example of a radical change in
environment leading to an increase in takeover attempts. The figures in
table 3 indicate that while such a view has some basis as regards oil and
gas, hostile takeovers are not confined to a few industries in the throes
of deregulation or otherwise undergoing major changes. Of course, it
may simply be that many industries have encountered unusual competi-
tive pressures in recent years. In any event, the distribution of hostile
takeovers is fairly similar to that of other acquisitions. This similarity
may itself explain why such a small number of transactions generates
suchwidespread concern. If hostile takeovers were concentrated in just
a few industries, only those involved with these industries need be
concerned about the possibility of a takeover; everyone else could rest
secure. If hostile takeovers are widely distributed, no one is safe.
Finally, it is important to recognize that the number of contested
tender offers understates the number of unwelcome offers. Probably a
substantial fraction of uncontested tender offers, and possibly of merger
overtures as well, are not welcomed by target management. Some of
these acquisition attempts might be contested were it not for the fact that206 Lynn E. Browne and Eric S. Rosengren
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Not    Tenders
All    Ten- Uncon- Con-
Attempts ders tested tested
3 2 1 0
27 17 6 4
24 14 6 4
7 6 0 1
225 151 46 28
24 14 6 4
10 8 2 0
13 7 3 3
11 7 3 1
8 7 0 1
12 7 3 2
9 3 3 3
10 6 2 2
7 4 1 2
13 12 1 0
17 14 3 0
24 14 7 3
Percent of Total
Not Tenders
All Ten- Uncdn- Con-
Attempts ders tested tested
,7 .7 1.2 0
6.6 6.2 7.0 8.7
5.9 5.1 7,0 8,7
1.7 2.2 0 2.2
55.3 54.9 53.5 60.9
5.9 5.1 7.0 8.7
2.5 2.9 2.3 0
3.2 2.5 3.5 6.5
2.7 2.5 3.5 2.2
2.0 2.5 0 2.2
2.9 2.5 3.5 4.3
2.2 1.1 3.5 6.5
2.5 2.2 2.3 4.3
1.7 1.5 1.2 4,3
3,2 4.4 1.2 0
4.2 5.1 3.5 0
5,9 5.1 8.1 6.5
26 20 3 3 6.4 7.3 3.5 6.5
18 13 4 1 4.4 4.7 4.7 2.2
10 5 3 2 2.5 1.8 3.5 4.3
13 10 1 2 3.2 3.6 1.2 4.3
6 5 0 1 1.5 1,8 0 2.2
6 4 " 1 1 1.5 1.5 1.2 2.2
15 6 5 4 3.7 2.2 5.8 8.7
14 5 5 4 3.4 1.8 5.8 8.7
50 32 15 3 12.3 11.6 17.4 6.5
38 33 4 1 9,3 12.0 4.7 2.2
23 14 7 2 5.7 5,1 8,1 4.3
407 275 86 46 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Note: Distribution of offers by industry of target company for companies that were targets of acquisition
attempts 1983-85. Some companies were targets of more than one offer. The sample consists of compa-
nies trading on the major exchanges that ceased to trade because of an acquisition appearing in Mer-
gerstat Review or that were targets of an unsuccessful acquisition attempt recorded in the Mergerstat
Reviews for 1983 to 1985.
Source: CRSP Stock Files, Center for Research in Security Prices, University of Chicago, 1987; Merger-
stat Review, various issues.
so many contests fail to preserve the target’s independence. Between
1976 and 1986 only one-quarter of the companies that contested tender
offers succeeded in remaining independent; if they were not taken overARE HOSTILE TAKEOVERS DIFFERENT? 207
by the initial bidder they were acquired by a third party.4 Moreover, for a
number of companies that did succeed in remaining independent, the
price of independence was severe cost-cutting or the sale of major por-
tions of their business.
Although the large size of the targets of hostile takeovers and the
fact that no industry is immune mean that the economic significance of
takeovers is greater than their numbers would suggest, this is not reason
to treat them differently from other forms of acquisition. The following
section summarizes the central issues in the dispute over whether take-
overs should be restricted.
What Is Wrong/Right with Takeovers?
Discussions of whether or not takeovers should be restricted are
often mixed up with discussions of the positive and negative conse-
quences of mergers in general. Do mergers "work:" Is the resulting entity
more competitive and more profitable? What is the source of any in-
creased profitability? Is too much debt incurred in the acquisition pro-
cess? What will be the impact on employees? However, while the debate
often follows these lines, much of the opposition to hostile takeovers
seems to derive less from the adverse consequences of corporate combi-
nations than from the mechanism whereby combinations occur and
from the relationship between acquirer and acquired. Among the most
vociferous critics of hostile takeovers are some of the chief executives of
large companies that have been active participants in the merger and
acquisition process, although as bidders rather than targets. Clearly they
are not opposed to acquisitions in general. Moreover, most antitakeover
legislation does not address problems arising from acquisitions in gener-
al; it would not preclude friendly combinations. It is directed only at
acquisition attempts opposed by management of the target company.
Why should the opposition of target management be the basis for
imposing more stringent requirements on an acquisition attempt? Man-
agers typically defend their opposition to takeover proposals on the
grounds that the offers are inadequate. The true value of the company
exceeds the value offered and in opposing the proposal, management is
acting in the shareholders’ interests. The protection of shareholders is
also the ostensible purpose of recent antitakeover legislation. Propo-
nents of the Indiana Act argue that it enables shareholders to decide
collectively upon the desirability of a change in control; in particular, the
Act is said to permit a more considered response to potentially coercive
two-tier and partial tender offers. This view was apparently accepted by
4 Mergerstat Review 1986, p. 79.208 Lynn E. Browne and Eric S. Rosengren
the Supreme Court: according to Justice Powell, in the majority opinion,
"The primary purpose of the Act is to protect the shareholders of Indiana
corporations. ,,5
Since the Indiana Act and its offspring are not intended to apply to
mergers, there is a presumption that the agreement of target manage-
ment to an acquisition proposal is sufficient protection for shareholders.
If this is the case and if such protection is necessary, then one would
expect shareholders to fare better in acquisitions that had target manage-
ment’s support than in hostile takeovers. The next section of this paper
will compare what happens to stock prices in a contested tender offer
with the experience in other types of acquisitions.
Managers may be quite sincere in opposing what they consider to
be inadequate tender offers. Although most offers are substantially
above the market price, stock prices can be volatile and a manager might
have reason to think that his company’s stock will sell at a higher price in
the future. In addition, opposition to a tender offer may induce the
bidder to sweeten his offer or may create an opportunity for additional
bidders to enter the competition and bid up the price. In a recent exami-
nation of the premiums on contested and uncontested tender offers an-
nounced in 1985, the authors found that the highest premiums were
offered by successful "white knights" -- bidders acquiring companies
that were already targets of takeover attempts. More generally, premi-
ums were higher in situations involving multiple bidders (Browne and
Rosengren 1987). Even the prospect of competition among bidders may
result in a higher bid than otherwise; the initial bidder may set his bid so
as to preclude competing offers and if competition seems to be material-
izing may subsequently increase the bid.
However, while management opposition to a takeover proposal can
benefit target company shareholders, a conflict between the interests of
shareholders and the interests of management exists in the face of a
takeover that is not present in other corporate decisionmaking. Fre~
quently target management is displaced as a result of a takeover, either
because there is no room for target management in the hierarchy of the
combined structure or because the acquirer does not think target man~
agement is doing a good job.
The incentive for target management to oppose an acquisition at-
tempt is greater, the greater the threat of displacement. This suggests
that acquisitions of larger companies are more likely to be opposed than
smaller companies, since it will be more difficult to absorb target man~
agement. The chief executive of a small company can become a group
5 Supreme Court of the United States, CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corporation of America et
al. Appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, No. 86-71.
Argued March 2, 1987 Decided April 21, 1987, p. 20.ARE HOSTILE TAKEOVERS DIFFERENT? 209
vice-president within a larger entity with no loss of prestige or salary;
but how many companies--no matter how large--have room for two
"captains of industry"? By this reasoning, one might also expect acquisi-
tions of companies that are performing poorly, since target management
could expect to be judged inadequate. Thus, opposition to a takeover
could be an admission of poor management.
Whether or not target management considers itself to be inad-
equate, the fact that a bidder makes a tender offer without engaging in
negotiations with management may foster opposition. Such a tender
offer is a statement that at least one entity--the bidder--views the target
company as not performing up to its potential and, further, that the
support of target management is not necessary to achieve a better per-
formance. Such a statement obviously will not sit well with target man-
agement. However, to the extent that it is an accurate assessment,
shareholders will be better off if the company is taken over than if it
remains independent. At least from a shareholder’s perspective, one
would not wish to make such takeovers more difficult or less certain in
outcome.
Equally importantly, if targets of hostile takeovers are not maximiz-
ing shareholder returns, takeovers may benefit not only the sharehold-
ers of the targets but also those of other companies. Managers of other
companies will see that poor performance increases their companies’
vulnerability to takeover and will, therefore, have an added incentive to
achieve good results for their shareholders. Those who oppose restric-
tions on takeovers typically hold this view, arguing that takeovers not
only result in gains to shareholders of the target companies but also
exert a useful discipline on managers to the benefit of the economy as a
whole.
This position does assume, however, that good performance can be
discerned fairly readily: targets of hostile takeovers must be recognized
to be performing below their potential if takeovers are to have a salutory
effect on firm management in general. Moreover, if targets of hostile
takeovers are not underperforming--or are underperforming according
to criteria apparent only to the bidder hostile takeovers will appear to
managers as random "bolts from the blue." In this case, takeovers will
not provide positive incentives, as management will not see serving
their shareholders" interests as protecting them from takeovers. Indeed,
takeovers may have a negative effect, as managers may be led to protect
themselves in other ways. At a minimum, defensive activities distract
management’s attention from running the company, and in some cases
they may actually be harmful, as when management embarks on its own
acquisition program simply to make the company too big to swallow.
A later section of this paper will compare the performance of com-
panies that were targets of contested tender offers and companies in-2!0 Lynn E. Browne and Eric S, Rosengren
volved in other types of acquisition attempts. It will also discuss some of
the ambiguities surrounding the concept of good performance.
The Effect of Takeovers on Shareholders
Central to any debate over antitakeover legislation is the anticipated
effect of restrictions on shareholders. Unlike management and employ-
ees, shareholders know with certainty that their economic interests will
be directly affected by a takeover. As a result, numerous laws protecting
the interests of shareholders during takeovers have been adopted since
the 1930s. Requirements that a bidder disclose financing sources and
intentions, as well as restrictions on the tender process, provide inves-
tors an opportunity to evaluate a takeover proposal. In contrast, the
focus of much of the current legislation is not on fuller disdosure; rather,
it severely discourages offers actively opposed by management. Since
stock prices are often very volatile, and the expected return of current
projects may be difficult to assess, management may prevent bids that
would be rejected if shareholders were better informed. However, if
management is overly optimistic about its firm, or if management’s in-
terests diverge from those of the shareholders, management may reject
offers that fully informed shareholders would accept.
Table 4 provides the average premium for merger and acquisition
offers from 1983 to 1985. Each offer is classified as a merger, uncontested
tender offer, or contested tender offer. Firms taken private by means
other than tender offer are included in the mergers and other offers
category. The premiums are calculated as the percentage increase from
the closing price of the stock five days before the date of the announce-
ment; for offers with a previous bidder, the premium for the new offer is
calculated from five days before the announcement of the initial offer.
Acquisition attempts, regardless of their form, generally provide
stockholders substantial gains. The lowest average premium for any
category is 30 percent. Thus, legislation that prevented takeover targets
from receiving any offers would clearly be detrimental to shareholders.
Average premiums show remarkably small differences between contest-
ed offers, uncontested tenders, or mergers. In 1985 the average premi-
um for hostile tender offers was 31.1 percent, within 2 percentage points
of uncontested offers and mergers. In 1984 hostile tender offers had
premiums equal to those of uncontested offers and 1 percentage point
larger than mergers. While there is substantial variation in the size of
premiums within each acquisition category, as shown by the large stan-
dard deviations, there is little evidence that premiums on hostile tender
offers are significantly different from offers not opposed by manage-
ment. Surprisingly, there is also little difference between the averageTable 4
Average Premium Offered in Merger and Acquisition Attempts
All Offers Successful Offers
Number/Number Average Premium Standard Number/Number Average Premium Standard
with data (Percent) Deviation with data (Percent) Deviation
1985a
All 152 31.6 23.9 100 33.3 24.3
Tender Offers 57 30.8 21.0 43 32.2 20.3
Uncontested 35 30.6 22.0 34 31.1 22.2
Contested 22 31.1 19.2 9 36.4 9.5
Mergers and Other
Offers, excluding Tenders 95 32.1 25,5 57 34.2 26.9
1984a
All 162/156 38.0 29.1 106/102 38.3 30,7
Tender Offers 46/45 38.8 26.1 36/35 38,9 27.2
Uncontested 36/35 38.8 28.3 32/31 38.2 27.9
Contested 10 38.8 15.9 4 44.2 19.5
Mergers and Other
Offers, excluding Tenders 116/111 37.7 30.3 70/67 37,9 32.4
1983a
All 92/90 43.7 47.5 65/63 38.6 24.7
Tender Offers 28 39.1 22.1 21 39.2 25.0
Uncontested 14 32.4 24.9 13 31.7 25.7
Contested 14 45.9 16.4 8 51.5 18.3
Mergers and Other
Offers, excluding Tenders 64/62 45.8 55.2 44/42 38.3 24.5
aAttempts in a given year include acquisitions of companies removed from CRSP file in that year and also included in Mergerstat and unsuccessful attempts listed in
Mergerstat for that year.
Source: CRSP Stock Files, Center for Research in Security Prices, University of Chicago, 1987; Mergerstat Review, various issues.212 Lynn E. Browne and Eric S. Rosengren
premium on successful offers and that on all offers, indicating that even
unsuccessful acquisition attempts generally offer substantial premiums
to stockholders.
While table 4 suggests that there is little difference in premiums
between offers opposed by management and those without active oppo-
sition, it fails to control for several variables that could substantially
affect the size of the premium. Premiums applied to only a fraction of
the target shares, particularly those that provide a controlling interest in
the company, may be higher than bids for all outstanding shares. Move-
ments in the general level of stock prices around the time of the offer
may influence the bid. Since stocks tend to move in conjunction with the
market portfolio, failing to control for the movement in the market index
at the time of the announcement could bias the results. Finally, the
riskiness of the target stock may affect the size of the premium. Since
movements in the market portfolio cannot be diversified away, stocks
that move together with the market, frequently referred to as high beta
stocks, subject the investor to greater risk. Our event study, a technique
widely used in the finance literature, controls for these factors.
Event studies are an application of the capital asset pricing model.
Using a simple model of stock returns, a forecast of what the return
would have been in the absence of an event is compared with the actual
return. The difference between the forecasted return and the actual re-
turn is attributed to the event. Equation 1 summarizes the calculation of
excess returns, the difference between the actual return and the forecast-
ed return after controlling for movement in the market portfolio and the
riskiness of the stock.
(1) ERit = Rit - ai - bi Rmt
where Rit = return on stock i for day t
Rmt = return on the market portfolio for day t
ai = constant, estimated from a period prior to the event
bi = beta of stock i, measure of non-diversifiable risk,
estimated from a period prior to the event
It is assumed that the forecast errors are not attributable to other
events possibly occurring at the same time or to a badly specified fore-
casting model. The latter assumption is particularly important. While
the "true" market portfolio is unobservable, this study, like most event
studies, uses the value-weighted New York and American Stock Ex-
change index as a proxy for the market portfolio. Roll (1977) has shown
that applying the Capital Asset Pricing Model with the wrong index can
bias the results; however, it is assumed that using the value-weighted
index as a proxy for the "true" market portfolio does not introduce sig-
nificant biases into the study. It is also assumed that ai and bi are stable
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study the estimation period is the 180 trading days from 240 days before
the event to 61 days before the event.
To determine the impact of the merger on takeover targets, the ex-
cess returns are summed over an event window and averaged over firms
to obtain the cumulative average residual (CAR).
(2) CAR = ~i=~0 t__~pERit
where n -- number of firms
p = number of days before the event day (day 0)
q = number of days after the event day
If takeovers were always a complete surprise, the event window
over which the excess return should be measured would be the an-
nouncement date. However, as the Boesky disclosures have made clear,
information about takeovers is frequently available to some market par-
ticipants prior to the public announcement. A choice of a larger window
may capture information released prior to the announcement but risks
including movements in stock price unrelated to the takeover. A choice
of a small window risks missing some stock appreciation related to early
release of takeover information and underestimating the cumulative
average residual attributable to the takeover. This is a particular problem
in this study, which compares cumulative average residuals by type of
acquisition, since some acquisition methods may be more susceptible to
prior release of information, either because of the number of people
involved prior to the formal takeover announcement or for strategic
reasons relating to the bidding process. Consequently, two windows
were considered--a 41-day window spanning the 30 trading days before
the announcement date to 10 days after the announcement, and an 11-
day window, from five days before the announcement to five days after.
While arbitrary, they illustrate how sensitive the results are to the choice
of window.
To test the significance of the cumulative average residuals it was
necessary to construct a test statistic. A procedure common in the event
study literature was followed, based on the construction of standardized
cumulative residuals that are assumed to be distributed standard nor-
mal. (See the appendix for details.) Two hypotheses were examined. The
first was that the cumulative average residuals are insignificantly differ-
ent from zero, since previous studies of acquisition attempts found sub-
stantial positive returns to the target firm. The second maintained
hypothesis was that excess returns for uncontested tenders, mergers,
and firms taken private equal the average excess returns for contested
tenders having the same event window. If tender offers that were op-214 Lynn E. Browne and Eric S. Rosengren
Table 5
Cumulative Average Residuals by Type of Takeover Attempt, 1985
41-Day 11-Day
Event Window Event Window
Tender Offers
Contested
Cumulative Average Residuals .23 .16
z-0 (8.58)* (11.62)*
Uncontested
Cumulative Average Residuals ,23 ,22
z-0 (12.00)* (21.03)*
z-contested (.57) (5.28)*
Mergers and Other Offers, excluding Tenders
Private by Management
Cumulative Average Residuals .12 .15
z-0 (4.45)* (10.46)*
z-contested (- 2.92)* (.58)
Mergers
Cumulative Average Residuals .20 .13
z-O (11.89)* (17.39)*
z-conteste~l (- 1.98) (- 1.35)
Note: z statistic is distributed standard normal,
* significant at the 5% confidence level for a two4ailed test,
posed by management were not in the interest of stockholders, the re-
turn from offers opposed by management should be lower than the
return from offers unopposed by management.
Table 5 provides the cumulative average residual for each type of
takeover. Multiple bidder contests are classified by the original bidder,
so that unlike table 4, which calculates bidder premiums, there is only
one bidding firm included for each acquired firm. Using the 41-day win-
dow, the cumulative average residuals are all significantly different from
zero at the 5 percent confidence level and no category of takeover has
larger excess returns than the contested tender offer. Thus, for a 41-day
window, stockholders appear to fare quite well from offers that were
opposed by management, with an average 23 percent return after con-
trolling for the general movement in stock prices.
While contested tenders have the same cumulative average residual
as uncontested, the residual for contested tenders is 11 percentage
points greater than for firms taken private. One can reject the hypoth-
esis that average excess returns for private acquisitions are equal to the
average excess returns for contested firms at the 5 percent level. There-
fore, stockholders appear to have higher returns on acquisitions op-
posed by management than on acquisitions where management or
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explained by the probability that an initial offer is successful. Both con-
tested tender offers and offers to go private have a 50 percent chance of
success, and the returns over the 41-day window are very similar be-
tween successful and unsuccessful takeover attempts.
One possible reason for the higher premiums is that contested
tender offers are more likely to become multiple-bidder contests. Rough-
ly 40 percent of the contested tender offers attract additional bidders
while approximately 30 percent of the private offers result in additional
bidders. Therefore, part of the excess return experienced by hostile
tenders may reflect investors’ expectations of higher future bids. Con-
tested tender offers that eventually became multiple-bidder contests had
a cumulative average residual of 30 percent, while contested tenders
that remained single-bidder contests had a cumulative average residual
of only 19 percent.
Using the 11-day window, the cumulative average residual for con-
tested tender offers is larger than for mergers or for firms being taken
private. However, uncontested tender offers have the highest cumula-
tive average residual and the excess returns are significantly larger than
the average excess returns for contested tender offers. The higher cumu-
lative average residual for uncontested tenders may partly be explained
by differences in bidding strategies. In contested tender offers, early
release of information about a tender offer may apply pressure on the
top management of the target firm and help to place the firm "in play." In
addition, given management’s opposition, it may be more profitable to
sell to a "white knight." Therefore, encouraging additional bidders may
be more rewarding than successfully acquiring the firm. Firms without
active opposition by management are much more likely to successfully
acquire the firm and may prefer to maintain secrecy to prevent addition-
al bidders from entering the auction and driving up the price. If so, the
cumulative average residual would follow the pattern we observe in the
table, with most of the increase in returns for uncontested offers occur-
ring around the announcement, while relatively less of the total appre-
ciation of the contested firm occurs around the announcement.
From a shareholder’s perspective, restricting tender offers that are
opposed by management would be undesirable. In cases where existing
management is firmly entrenched, no offers may occur, thus depriving
the shareholders of the appreciation in share prices that normally results
from a takeover offer. Policies requiring management approval are also
likely to discourage multiple-bidder contests, contests that frequently
provide the highest returns for shareholders. Acquisitions requiring
management approval, mergers and firms taken private by manage-
ment, have lower average returns than tender offers that management
actively opposes. Thus, legislation that discourages offers not supported
by management are not likely to be in the best interests of shareholders.216 Lynn E. Browne and Eric S. Rosengren
Characteristics of Targets of Hostile Takeovers
As was discussed above, there is some basis for thinking that targets
of hostile takeovers might be more poorly managed than companies
involved in friendlier acquisition attempts. If takeover targets are, in
fact, poorly managed, this poor performance is a powerful argument
against restricting hostile takeovers. Shareholders of potential targets
will suffer; current management will remain in place or, if a change in
control does take place as a result of a merger, it will be on terms deter~
mined by a management that has not represented shareholders well in
the past. Of perhaps even greater significance is the message that pro-
tection of poor performers from possible displacement sends to manag-
ers of other companies. Assessing what constitutes poor management is
far from simple, however.
One view-~commonly held by those opposed to restricting take-
overs--is that stock prices are the best guides to performance. Stock
prices embody all that is publicly known about both a firm’s current
circumstances and its future prospects. If one thinks of the stock price as
the present value of the stream of earnings that an owner of a share of
stock can expect to receive, then a firm that has a promising future with
rising earnings will have a higher stock price than one with the same
current earnings but a more negative outlook. In other words, the ratio
of price to earnings will be higher for the first firm. It is management’s
responsibility to maximize share prices and thus, shareholder wealth.
Poorly managed firms, according to this view, are firms with low stock
prices and price-earnings ratios.
However, while the price-earnings ratio may provide some indica-
tion of how investors see a firm’s future, the quality of management is
not the only factor that affects that future. The world may change in
ways that even the best management could not anticipate, brightening
the future for some firms and darkening it for others. In addition, price-
earnings ratios are only meaningful for firms with earnings in some
normal range. A firm may suffer losses, but the value of its shares will
still be positive, resulting in a negative price-earnings ratio; or a firm
may experience very small positive earnings, causing its price-earnings
ratio to be very large even though the firm’s prospects are not very
promising.
The book value of shareholders’ equity provides another basis for
evaluating share prices. Comparing the ratios of price to book value (per
share) for different firms is equivalent to comparing the firms’ share
prices with what earnings would be if the firms all achieved the same
return on equity. For example, if all firms earned a 12 percent return on
equity, comparing the resulting price-earnings ratios would produce the
same results as comparing ratios of price to book value. Thus, the ratioARE HOSTILE TAKEOVERS DIFFERENT? 217
of price to book value can be seen as a price-earnings ratio in which the
denominator is not the firm’s actual earnings but what earnings would
be if the firm achieved some "normal" return on equity. A low price-to-
book ratio could reflect either below-normal earnings today or normal
current earnings but an unpromising future.
In addition, a price-to-book ratio that is below one means that a firm
cannot issue new stock without diluting the value of the’ holdings of
current shareholders. This can be a deterrent to expansion, or at least to
the use of equity to expand. From the standpoint of those who see stock
prices as providing accurate assessments of future prospects, a low
price-to-book ratio indicates that a firm’s investment plans will not yield
satisfactory returns and should be curtailed.
A more fundamental question is whether share prices are reason-
ably valid representations of firms’ prospects. Despite a substantial lit-
erature based on this view, many people believe that the stock market is
subject to whims, fads and unfounded rumors and, consequently, that
share prices are unreliable indicators of future earnings. To the extent
that there is some truth to this view, share prices are not useful guides to
whether management is doing a good job. A low share price may mean
simply that the firm in question is not "in;" perhaps there have been no
recent developments to bring the firm to the attention of market partici-
pants or perhaps the price has been discounted on the basis of rather
superficial analysis.
However, even if stock prices are not good guides to management
performance, they might still be good indicators of vulnerability to take-
over. Share prices are, after all, prices; and the significance of a low
price-earnings ratio or price-to-book ratio may not be so much that the
firm’s future looks bleak--at least under current management--as that
the price of acquiring the firm’s assets and the associated stream of
earnings is low. In other words, the firm is cheap.
Various accounting ratios offer another approach to measuring the
performance of takeover targets. The problem with these is that they
show only what the firm is doing today--or over some specified time
horizon--and performance at any one time may not be a good guide to
the future. Thus, earnings may be high today as a result of wise deci-
sions by past managers; but today’s managers may have embarked on a
different course. Conversely, the future may be bright even though earn-
ings are low today. Indeed, many start-up companies encounter losses
in their early years. Some companies have highly cyclical earnings. Stock
prices can capture both the present and what is known about the future.
The return on equity is one of the more common measures of firm
performance. It is also one that does not suffer from any ambiguity
about what is desirable. Higher is better. This is not true of some of the
other standard accounting ratios. In particular, measures showing the218 Lynn E. Browne and Eric S. Rosengren
use of financial resources may be subject to different interpretations.
According to one view, companies with relatively large liquid assets and
low use of debt are likely to be takeover targets. These firms do not use
their financial resources as efficiently as they might; by relying more heavi-
ly on debt and reducing the proportion of their assets in low-yielding
working capital they could achieve higher earnings. However, others
might see these firms as prudently managed, particularly if the firms
were already achieving high earnings. High liquidity and low leverage
provide managers with flexibility in the event of a downturn and reduce
the firm’s vulnerability to bankruptcy. These ambiguities suggest that an
assessment of how well a firm is managed may depend upon one’s
attitude towards risk.
One variant of the view that takeover targets are not managing
financial resources efficiently is the free cash flow hypothesis developed
by Jensen. "Free cash flow is cash flow in excess of that required to fund
all projects that have positive net present values when discounted at the
relevant cost of capital" (Jensen 1986, p. 323). Companies that generate
substantial cash flows and that use these funds internally in low-value
uses rather than pay out the cash to shareholders will be targets of
takeovers. The share price will reflect the fact that the cash flow is going
to projects with lower returns than could be obtained elsewhere. A bid-
der acquiring control of these companies can increase the share price
simply by ceasing these low-value activities and paying out more cash.
Table 6 presents averages of financial ratios, representing some of
these elements of performance, for the acquisition targets of table 2.
Ratios in both 1984 and 1983 are shown for the 1985 targets. The financial
ratios vary greatly within acquisition categories and outlying observa-
tions frequently result in large distortions. Consequently, the averages
in table 6 are based on the 50 percent of observations around the median
observation in each acquisition category; in other words, they are aver-
ages of the "normal" values for each acquisition category. The averages
for all observations, along with associated standard deviations and the
number of observations in each category, appear in the appendix. (The
number of observations is smaller than the number of target companies
as some financial variables were not available for some firms.)6
To provide some indication of what these financial ratios might look
like for firms that are not targets of acquisition attempts, the table also
includes the relevant ratios for "all industrials" from the Compustat in-
dustry aggregates file. (To be included in this file, the firms must be
6 Also, financial reports for 1984 were not available in some cases. The annual data
provided by the source, Compustat, are based on companies’ fiscal years. Data for compa-
nies with fiscal years ending in the first five months of the calendar year are treated as
occurring in the previous calendar year. This is one reason why there are more observa-
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Table 6
Financial Characteristics of 1985 Acquisition Targets
Average Values for Middle Two Quartiles of Observation
inverse of Ratio of Cash Ratio of Price
Market Value Price-Earn- Flow to to Book
Target                 ($ millions)     ings Ratio Market Value     Value
1984 1983 1984 1983 1984 1983 1984 1983
Contested Tenders 425.8 429.5 .096 .086 .179 .170 1.11 1.15
Uncontested Tenders 719.5 496.9 .087 ~084 .158 .138 1.36 1.45
Private by Management 101,0 102.3 ,088 ~066 .146 .155 1.37 1.43
Mergers 139.6 126,6 .093 ,066 .164 .129 1.22 1.39
All excluding Contested 175.8 162.0 .090 ,072 .158 .137 1.29 1.41
All Industrials 621.7 671.2 .093 .072 .180 .149 1.44 1.58
inverse of
Return on Coverage
Target                    Equity      Pan’out Ratio     Ratio
1984 1983 1984 1983 1984 1983 1984
Contested Tenders .118 .096 .347 .329 .231 .247 .185
Uncontested Tenders .138 .132 .315 .215 .197 .197 .159
Private by Management .129 .114 .120 ,063 ,172 .141 .213
Mergers ,117 ,096 .194 ,171 .217 ,265 ,179











All Industrials .133 .113 .382 .438 .206 .215 .178 .169
Capital
Expenditures/
Target                      Liquidity         Depreciation
1984    1983     1984    1983
Contested Tenders 1.94 1.94 1.64 1.31
Uncontested Tenders 1.84 2.18 1.81 1.62
Private by Management 2.02 2.08 1.31 1.49
Mergers 1.96 2,36 1.52 1.14









All Industrials 1.56 1.61 1.76 1.55 n.a, n.a.
Source: Standard & Poor’s Compustat Services Inc.
followed regularly by Compustat and must meet certain size and indus-
try representation criteria.) It should be noted, however, that the indus-
trials" ratios are ratios of aggregate industry variables, while the ratios
for the various acquisition categories are averages of individual firms’
ratios.
The variables appearing in the table are as follows:
(1) Total market value, calculated as the calendar year closing price
(Compustat data item 24) multipled by the number of common shares220 Lynn E. Browne and Erie S. Rosengren
outstanding (item 25).
(2) Inverse of the price-earnings ratio, calculated by dividing income
before extraordinary items adjusted for common stock equivalents (item
20) by the market value. The higher the price-earnings ratio, the lower
will be the inverse.
(3) Cash flow, defined as income before extraordinary items (item
18) plus depreciation (item 14), relative to market value. This was includ-
ed on the grounds that cash flow might be a more meaningful indicator
than income of the stream of funds available to those controlling the
corporation.
(4) Price relative to book value, calculated as the market value rela-
tive to common equity (item 60).
(5) Return on equity, or income before extraordinary items adjusted
for common stock equivalents relative to common equity.
(6) Payout ratio, or the ratioof common dividends (item 21) to income
before extraordinary items adjusted for common stock equivalents.
(7) Inverse of the coverage ratio, or interest (item 15) relative to the
sum of interest and pre-tax income (item 70). The lower the interest
relative to interest and pre-tax income, or conversely the higher the
coverage ratio, the more debt the company can carry without experienc-
ing difficulties. Bond indentures often specify minimum coverage ratios.
Thus, a higher coverage ratio may make a firm an attractive takeover
target, while a very low coverage ratio may be an indicator of a firm in
financial difficulty.
(8) Longmterm debt (item 9) relative to total assets (item 6), a mea-
sure of leverage. A low value would indicate that a firm could assume
more debt.
(9) Current assets (item 4) relative to current liabilities (item 5), a
measure of liquidity.
(10) Capital expenditures (item 30) relative to depreciation.
(11) Research and development expenditures (item 46) relative to
sales (item 12).
The last two items are included because opponents of takeovers
have claimed that fear of takeovers causes firms to focus on increasing
earnings in the short run to the detriment of the long run. By implica-
tion, firms that are targets of hostile takeovers are firms that have failed
to adopt a short-run mentality and have continued to pursue long-run
profit goals. Capital spending and research and development expendi-
tures are intended to capture an orientation to the long run.
An examination of these financial characteristics reveals that targets
of contested tender offers were not statistically different from targets of
other acquisition attempts in any respect except size. In other words, all
one can say with confidence is that targets of contested tender offers had
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based on the averages and standard deviations appearing in the appen-
dix. Despite this general finding, the ratios in table 6 warrant comment.
For normal observations, there appear to be small differences.
Share prices for targets of contested tender offers were a little low.
Income and cash flow were both slightly higher relative to market value
for targets of contested tender offers than for targets of other acquisition
attempts. The ratio of price to book value was lower. Thus, depending
on one’s perspective, either managers of hostile takeover targets were
not quite as successful as other managers in maintaining share prices or
¯ targets of hostile takeovers were a little cheaper than other acquisitions.
The various ratios involving share prices did not differ markedly be-
tween the acquisition targets and "all industrials," although the industri-
al price-to-book ratio was somewhat higher.
The return on equity is perhaps the most interesting ratio. The vari-
ation in the return on equity was considerably smaller for targets of
contested tender offers than for other firms in the sample. In particular,
only two of 20 firms facing hostile takeovers in 1985 experienced losses
in 1983; none (out of 19 observations) had losses in 1984. In contrast, 18
percent of the firms that were targets of other acquisition attempts expe-
rienced losses in 1983, 14 percent in 1984. Most of the firms experiencing
losses were targets of mergers or of attempts by management to go
private. Losses among targets of uncontested tender offers were rare. It
would appear that bidders do not make tender offers for companies that
are in serious financial difficulty, but companies in serious financial diffi-
culty may look to merger partners to help solve their problems.
Because there were so few negative returns among the targets of
contested tender offers, the average rate of return for targets of contest-
ed tender offers (shown in the apppendix) was higher than that for other
targets. For the middle range of observations, however, the average
return on equity was lower for targets of contested tender offers than for
the rest of the sample. While there were few "losers" among the contest-
ed targets, the norm was mediocre. Payout ratios were normally higher
for targets of contested tender offers than for targets of other acquisition
attempts. (Payout ratios were below the "all industrials" averages; but to
the extent that some firms with losses pay dividends, an average based
on industry aggregates might well be higher than one based on individ-
ual firm ratios.)
Neither the inverse of the coverage ratio nor the ratio of long-term
debt to assets suggests that targets of contested tender offers have more
capacity to take on debt than targets of other forms of acquisition. Simi-
larly, targets of contested tender offers were not more liquid than other
targets. (The liquidity ratios for all acquisition groups were higher than
the average for all industrials, however.) Finally, targets of contested
tender offers did not engage in more capital spending or research and222 Lynn E. Browne and Eric S. Rosengren
development activity than other targets. They were not victims of a
commitment to the long run.
In summary, targets of hostile tender offers in 1985 were not very
different from targets of friendlier acquisition attempts, except as regards
size. Targets of contested tender offers were larger than targets of other
acquisition proposals, although not larger than targets of uncontested
tender offers. The stock prices for the targets of contested tender offers
seem to have been a little lower than the prices for other targets, particu-
larly when measured against book value, but these differences cannot
withstand much scrutiny. Targets of acquisitions, both hostile and other-
wise, were smaller than the average company in Compustat’s industrial
file; they also appear to have had higher liquidity ratios. Once again,
however, differences were not striking except as regards size.
These results are generally consistent with those of other studies.
John Pound, in a study for the Investor Responsibility Research Center
Inc., examined the financial characteristics of friendly takeover targets,
hostile takeover targets that were acquired, hostile targets that remained
independent and a control group (Pound 1985). He found that the vari-
ation in characteristics was so great within groups that the groups could
not be distinguished statistically. Pound also found that the variables
changed considerably from year to year, so that one’s perception of the
relationships among acquisition categories could differ depending upon
the year in question. This caution should be borne in mind when look-
ing at the ratios in table 6.
A recent working paper published by the National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research looked at financial and other characteristics of Fortune
500 companies acquired in hostile and friendly transactions (Morck,
Shleifer and Vishny 1987). Again, there was little difference among the
companies for most financial variables. An exception was the ratio of
market value to replacement value of tangible assets, which was lower
for the hostile targets. This variable was not considered in the current
study, but some of its influence may have been captured in the price-to-
book-value ratio, which seems to have been lower for targets of contest-
ed tender offers. The NBER study also found that the companies taken
over in hostile acquisitions had earlier incorporation dates and differed
in some ownership characteristics from friendly acquisitions.
The picture of targets of hostile takeovers as rather ordinary firms,
at worst mediocre firms, does not change if one looks at them within
their own industries. Table 7 shows how many targets of contested
tender offers had returns on equity and price-to-book-value ratios above
and below the averages for their respective, industries. As can be seen
from the table, more takeover targets were below the industry averages
than above but the split was fairly balanced. Managers of most takeover
targets have legitimate reason to ask, "Why me?"ARE HOSTILE TAKEOVERS DIFFERENT? 223
Table 7
Return on Equity and Price-to-Book Value Ratios for
Targets of 1985 Contested Tender Offers
Number of Observations
Return on Equity Price to Book Value
1984 1983 t984 1983
Firm Ratio as a Multiple of the Industry Ratio
More than 1.1 6 6 6 5
.9 to 1.1 5 4 3 6
Less than .9 7 9 8 7
Data are not available for all firms or corresponding industries for both years. The number of observations
is smaller than the number (20) of targets of 1985 contested tender offers.
Source: Standard & Poor’s Compustat Services, Inc.
Conclusions
Hostile takeovers have become a source of intense interest and bit-
ter debate. Following the Supreme Court’s upholding in April 1987 of
Indiana’s antitakeover act, a number of states have adopted or are in the
process of adopting legislation making hostile takeovers more difficult
and more uncertain. Although advocates of restricting takeovers may be
motivated by other considerations, such restrictions are commonly justi-
fied on the grounds that they protect the shareholders of the takeover
targets. Since the restrictions would generally not affect friendly acquisi-
tions, the implication is that hostile takeovers are less favorable to share-
holders than other types of acquisition.
Opponents of restricting takeovers counter that target company
shareholders, far from benefiting from antitakeover legislation, will be
hurt: acquisition attempts will be discouraged and shareholders will be
denied the opportunity to sell their shares at an attractive premium. In
addition, shareholders of other companies will be adversely affected, as
takeovers perform an important disciplinary function in removing man-
agers who are failing to maximize shareholder wealth.
This paper examines, first, whether the experience of target com-
pany shareholders is less favorable in a hostile takeover attempt than in
other acquisition proposals and, second, whether targets of hostile take-
overs differ in key financial characteristics from the targets of other ac-
quisitions. It finds that shareholders fare as well in hostile takeovers as
in friendly acquisitions. The premiums offered in hostile takeovers are
comparable. More importantly perhaps, the stock market’s response to
the announcement of a hostile takeover is no different from its reaction
to other acquisition proposals. Stock prices rise just as much in response
to a tender offer that is contested as they do at the announcement that224 Lynn E. Browne and Eric S. Rosengren
management is trying to take a company private or that a company is the
object of a merger proposal. If one looks at stock prices over a very short
span around the announcement date, prices do not rise as much in
response to a contested tender offer as an uncontested tender offer.
However, for a somewhat longer event window there is no significant
difference. It appears that shareholders do not require protection from
hostile takeovers.
It also appears that companies that are targets of hostile takeovers
are not very different from targets of friendlier acquisition proposals and
probably not very different from companies generally. The share prices
for takeover targets appear to be a little lower relative to book value than
those of other acquisition targets, but the difference is not statistically
significant. Rates of return are not impressive for takeover targets, but
losses are rare. Targets of hostile takeovers are certainly not the worst-
managed firms. This is not the same as saying they cannot be better
managed-~only that simple measures do not show obvious failings.
Given the small number of firms that are targets of contested tender
offers, it is certainly possible that individual bidders could have suffi-
ciently detailed understandings of these companies to conclude that
current management is inadequate, even though standard financial ra-
tios do not reveal problems. In other words, takeover targets may be
performing below their potential, but the management failures and the
indicators of management failure may be unique to each case. It is also
possible, given the small number of hostile takeover targets, that the
choice of target has less to do with the failings of target management
than with the characteristics of the bidders. Some bidders are obviously
more willing to engage in hostile takeovers than others; and their knowl-
edge_of particular industries and preferences for particular types of firms
will have a strong influence on target choice.
In any event, the message that managers will find their firms vul-
nerable to takeover attempts if they fail in their responsibilities to share-
holders is fuzzy. To the extent that there are differences between targets
of hostile takeovers and targets of friendlier acquisition proposals, they
are very small and they certainly do not provide management with a
guide to what sort of performance will protect them from takeovers.
Discipline is only effective if the nature of the failure is clear and this
does not seem to be the case for hostile takeovers.
In conclusion, target company shareholders benefit from hostile
takeovers. Stock prices increase as much, if not more, in response to a
hostile tender offer as in response to a merger or management buyout.
However, the unremarkable nature of hostile takeover targets and the
absence of clear evidence of management failure casts doubt on the
argument that hostile takeovers exert a useful discipline on managers
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Appendix
The event study procedure followed in this article is the same as that found
in Dodd and Warner (1983), Linn and McConnell (1983), Malatesta (1983), and
Patell (1976). Patell provides the most thorough description of the assumptions
underlying the event test. The first step is to estimate what the expected return
of the stock would be in the absence of the event. Equation 1 is estimated from
240 days before the first event to 61 days before the event.
(1) Rit = ai + biRrnt + eit
where Rit = return on firm i on day t
Rrat = return on market portfolio on day t
eit = disturbance term with E(eit)= 0
t= -240, -239 .... -61
An event window, the period during which the event is expected to influ-
ence the return series, is arbitrary. Ideally, the event window would be deter-
mined by the day of the event. However, early release of information may cause
the return series to be influenced before the public announcement of a takeover.
Two event windows are used in this study. The first extends from 40 days before
the event to 10 days after the event, while the smaller window extends from 5
days before the event to 5 days after the event. Over each window, the excess
return (ERit) is calculated.
(2) ERit = Rit- ai - 6iRrnt
To determine whether an excess return is significantly different from 0, a
test statistic is created (Johnston 1972, pp. 154-55).
(3) SERit = ERit/sit
Sit = 82 1 +V + v       _





= residual variance from equation 1
= average market return over the period estimated in equation 1
= return to the market on day t
= return on the market on forecast day t
= number of days in estimation period
The standardized errors are summed to get the standardized cumulative
residual.
t=y
(4) SCRi = ~ SERitXY-°’s
t=l
Y = number of days in event window226
The test statistic is then calculated as
Lynn E. Browne and Eric S. Rosengren
(5) z = ASCR * N°’s N = number of firms
1N
ASCR = ~__ISCRi
The z statistic is assumed to be distributed standard normal.
Table A1 (1 of 3)
Financial Characteristics of 1985 Acquisition Targets
Inverse of Ratio of Ratio of
Price-Earnings Cash Flow to Price to
Market Value Ratio Market Value Book Value
Type of Acquisition 1984 1983 1984 1983 1984 1983 1984 1983
Contested Tender Offer
Observations 19 19 19 19 19 19 19 19
Average 2016.2 1605,9 .094 .086 .198 .187 1.185 1.247
Standard Deviation 408,3 2985,1 .039 .039 .079 .068 .370 .355
Uncontested Tender
Observations 20 29 20 29 20 29 20 29
Average 1072.4 834~0 .063 .077 .146 .141 1.537 1.760
Standard Deviation 1116.7 966.9 .116 .046 .102 .060 .776 1.213
Private by Management
Observations 20 22 20 22 20 22 20 22
Average 162.5 164.4 .061 .040 .166 .140 1,765 3.241
Standard Deviation 174.7 17,2 ,091 .094 .092 .091 1.465 7.657
Observations 52 59 53 59 49 55 53 59
Average 266.3 275.7 -.122 .013 .236 .099 1.378 1,612
Standard Deviation 436.4 505,0 1.430 .285 .680 .288 .875 1.323
All excluding Contested
Observations 92 110 93 110 89 106 93 110
Average 419.0 40.6 -,043 .035 .200 .119 1.496 1.977
Standard Deviation 711.1 676.8 1.098 .216 .510 .215 1.025 3.668
t-statistics for difference between means
Contested- Uncontested .97 1.27 1.07 .75 1,75 2.42 - 1,74 - 1.76
Contested-Private 1.98 2.20 1.41 1.97 1,15 1.79 -1.63 -1.11
Contested-Merger 3.00 3.24 ,65 1.11 -.24 1.29 -.92 -1.17
Contested-All Other 3.47 3.69 ,54 1.03 -.01 1.34 -1.29 -.86ARE HOSTILE TAKEOVERS DIFFERENT? 227
Table A1 (2 of 3)
Financial Characteristics of 1985 Acquisition Targets
Return on
Equity Payout Ratio
Acquisition 1984 1983 1984 1983
Contested Tender Offer
Observations 19 20 19
Average .110 .096 ,341
Standard Deviation .045 .049 .261
Uncontested Tender
Observations 20 29 20
Average .107 .123 .632
Standard Deviation .125 .083 .957
Private by Management
Observations 21 23 21
Average .100 -.275 .480
Standard Deviation .124 1.852 1.480
Observations 53 60 53
Ave rage .108 .163 .210
Standard Deviation .184 .563 .299
All excluding Contested
Observations 94 112 94
Average .106 .063 ,360
Standard Deviation .161 .095 .875
Inverse of
Coverage Ratio Leverage
1984 1983 1984 1983
20 17 19 18 20
,090 .244 .347 .199 .193
1.135 ,126 .380 .066 .085
29 20 27 20 29
.216 .162 1,524 .176 ,156
.667 .437 6.743 .099 .108
23 21 23 21 23
-,157 .189 .035 .217 .222
.794 ,384 .930 .119 ,140
60 52 59 53 60
.336 -.152 ,383 .204 .213
1.494 2.554 .581 ,161 .176
112 93 109 94 112
.203 -.008 ,592 .201 .200
1.215 1.936 3.454 ,141 .156
t-statistics for difference between means
Contested- Uncontested .08 - 1.29 - 1.25 -.48
Contested- Private .31 .87 - .39 .82
Contested - Merger .05 - .53 1.66 - ,66
Contested-All Other .10 .15 -.10 -.38
.73 -.74 .79 1.27
.55 1.34 -,56 -.79
.63 -.24 -.15 -.47
.53 -.31 -.08 -.19ARE HOSTILE TAKEOVERS DIFFERENT? 229
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John C. Coffee, Jr.*
Although the simple disciplinary model of the hostile takeover
views it as an engine of efficiency that creates value for shareholders,
largely by pruning corporate deadwood, the picture that emerges from
the data gathered by Lynn Browne and Eric Rosengren provides only
partial corroboration for this theory. Put simply, their findings support
the first half of this story--that is, that shareholders gain--but tend to
disconfirm the second half namely, that takeover targets are inefficient-
ly managed. Basically, they find that takeover targets are not statistically
distinguishable from other firms--either other acquisition targets in
"friendly" mergers or other firms within the same industry--at least in
terms of their financial characteristics. This view of targets of hostile
takeovers as rather ordinary firms, at worst mediocre firms, but rarely
the laggards within their industry, has been corroborated by other recent
research. John Pound’s work for the Investor Responsibility Research
Center, Inc. (1985), a recent paper by Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1987)
for the National Bureau of Economic Research, and earlier works by
other scholars--for example, Langetieg (1978), and Harris, Stewart and
Carleton (1982)--agree that the targets of takeovers do not appear statis-
tically different in their financial characteristics from other acquisition
targets or from other firms within their own industries. Still, the evi-
dence that shareholders gain from takeovers is irrefutable; no one seri-
ously challenges it, and the aggregate gains may be as high as $167
billion, according to Grundfest and Black (1987).
What explains wealth creation on this scale if there appear to be no
villains that deserve the tender offer’s guillotine? Several competing hy-
potheses can account for this pattern. At one polar position is Michael
Jensen’s "Free Cash Flow" theory, essentially a modified version of the
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disciplinary model, which argues that takeovers discipline a special kind
of managerial opportunism, namely the tendency toward cash hoarding
and empire-building. If most corporations engage in such behavior, then
we should not be surprised that takeover targets do not stand apart from
the herd in terms of their financial characteristics. At the other pole is a
thesis that asserts that takeovers do not create wealth but only transfer
it, largeIy as the result of disrupting (or breaching) "implicit contracts"
that once bound together the modern corporation as an economic and
social institution. This view has been most aggressively argued by.
Schleifer and Summers (1987), and earlier in a more qualified form by
both Knoeber (1986) and Coffee (1986). Of course, these two rival hy-
potheses are not necessarily inconsistent; each could explain a part of
the puzzle of the source of takeover gains.
By contrasting these two theories, I believe that we can better un-
derstand the forces that have produced the recent epidemic of state
takeover legislation. Just since the April 21, 1987 decision of the U.S.
Supreme Court in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 14 states have
adopted or modified laws designed to restrict takeovers.1 A majority of
the states have now passed a "second generation" takeover statute, and
with the recent passage by Delaware of its takeover statute, it has been
estimated that 80 percent of business capital in the United States is now
protected by such a statute.2 Thus, there is a clear and present danger
that over the next five-year period the rate of corporate takeovers and
associated transactions (such as leveraged buyouts and defensive merg-
ers) may sharply decline.
One can, of course, bemoan this trend or even suggest (as Securities
and Exchange Commission Chairman Ruder has) that state takeover
statutes should be preempted by new federal legislation, but the pros-
pects for preemptive legislation are at best bleak, since none of the major
bills pending before the Congress provides for it. Alternatively, we can
inquire (as I will attempt at the end of this comment) whether state
takeover regulation can be neutralized by a policy that seeks to secure
management’s acquiescence. My premise for this suggestion is that the
takeover gains to target shareholders are large enough to permit them to
compensate other constituencies who are adversely affected; thus, in
true Coasean fashion, the winners can "bribe" the losers and reach an
1 107 S. Ct. 1637 (1987). The 14 ~tates that have enacted antitakeover legislation since
that case are: Arizona, Delaware, Florida, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri,
Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina; Oregon, Utah, Washington and Wisconsin. See In-
vestor Responsibility Research Center (1987).
2 See the article by Doug Bandow, "Curbing Raiders Is Bad for Business," New York
Times, February 7, 1988 at F-2. For a recent list of states having antitakeover statutes, see
Investor Responsibility Research Center (1987).232 John C. Coffee, Jr.
efficient equilibrium, despite the significant legal barriers now being
erected in the path of takeovers at the state level.
The Alternative H~/potheses: Empire-Building versus
Implicit Contracting
Even the strongest proponents of a market for corporate control
have long conceded that the source of takeover gains remains a mystery
(Jensen and Ruback 1983). Recently, the debate over the source of these
gains has become more focused, as increasing evidence suggests that
target firms sell in the market at significant discounts from their asset
liquidation or break-up values. A National Bureau of Economic Research
working paper finds the one financial characteristic that distinguishes
hostile takeovers from friendly transactions (at least among Fortune 500
companies) to be the ratio of market value to replacement value of tangi-
ble assets. This ratio was lower for the hostile targets (Morck, Shleifer
and Vishny 1987).
Elsewhere, I have argued that the characteristic pattern of takeovers
began to shift in the early 1980s from "synergistic" acquisitions to "bust-
up" takeovers (Coffee 1986). The former, which are aggregative and as-
sume that the whole has greater value than the sum of the parts, had
been the dominant pattern throughout the earlier history of the takeover
(and indeed all earlier merger and acquisition peak periods). The bust-
up takeover is disaggregative and essentially involves a bidder who is
seeking to arbitrage the disparity between the stock value of the target
and its higher asset liquidation value. Historically, it is easy to under-
stand that the appearance of the junk bond market in the early 1980s
made such arbitrage transactions possible, but the deeper question in-
volves how to explain this "negative synergy" that makes many firms
more valuable broken up than intact. A number of theories have been
offered, including managerial risk aversion, imperfect information, the
redundancy of diversified investors owning diversified conglomerates,
and managerial compensation practices under which the firm promises
an "ex post" settling-up, a promise that the bust-up takeover breaches. I
believe further research will someday suggest that changes in the world
economy have also made the diversified or "M-Form" conglomerate a
comparatively less efficient vehicle for organizing economic activity than
alternative contractual arrangements: to reverse Oliver Williamson’s
well-known thesis, markets may today be more efficient than hierar-
chies, at least over some range of corporations, which are therefore take-
over targets.
Although a range of theories can be offered to explain the preva-DISCUSSION 233
lence of the bust-up takeover, the best-known contemporary theory is
probably Michael Jensen’s "Free Cash Flow" hypothesis (Jensen 1986).
Actually, this theory strikes me as largely a reinterpretation--with origi-
nal elements, to be sure--of the long tradition of "managerialist" theo-
ries, which has featured notable efforts by such writers as Baumol
(1959), Marris (1964), Williamson (1963), and more recently, Gordon
Donaldson (1984). These writers agree that there is an inherent tendency
for excessive growth, because managers" preferences deviate from those
of the shareholders. If so, investors should logically discount the firm’s
stock value below its "break-up" asset value, because the market would
anticipate that inefficient investment (that is, diversion of the free cash
flow) would continue. In addition, managers may refuse to sell assets or
divisions, even though another purchaser would pay more for the par-
ticular division; thus, assets do not flow to their highest and best use (or
at least to the most optimistic purchaser) until the firm’s bust-up permits
this potential asset value t6 be realized. Obviously, the recent finding
that target firms have a low ratio of market value to replacement cost
seems to corroborate this theory.
An alternative theory has been offered by another group of writers,
including this author, who view the modern corporation as a complex
institutional mechanism designed at least in part to uphold (and thus
permit reliance upon) "implicit contracts’! reached between the share-
holders and other "stakeholders" in the corporation--for example, man-
agers, creditors, employees, and possibly certain suppliers (Coffee 1986;
Knoeber 1986; Shleifer and Summers 1987). The nature of this implicit
contract can be variously defined. Some emphasize risk aversion: that is,
because shareholders own many stocks, while managers have but one
job, they strike an arrangement under which shareholders keep the re-
sidual returns, while managers receive the assurance of continuing em-
ployment and stable income (Coffee 1986). In short, managers trade off
higher returns for lower risk, but are as a result unwilling to commit the
firm to risky financial or investment decisions that shareholders would
favor. Alternatively, - one can model the shareholder/manager "implic-
it contract" as an attempt to foster investment by managers in "firm-
specific" human capital (Williamson 1984). To encourage such
investment, managers must be promised a form of quasi-tenure, be-
cause such "firm-specific" capital will have limited value to the market.
Finally, a third view begins with the recognition that it is difficult to
evaluate the senior manager’s value to the firm contemporaneously;
thus, optimal compensation requires an ex post settling-up process
(Knoeber 1986). That is, because one cannot know until years later
whether a specific investment decision or marketing strategy will pay
off, it is necessary to award deferred compensation on an ex post basis in
order to reward managers on a basis commensurate with their contribu-234 John C. Coffee, Jr.
tion to the firm’s earnings.
For present purposes, the differences among these theories are of
secondary importance, because all recognize the possibility that share-
holders could opportunistically breach the implicit contract. As a result
of such conduct, shareholder wealth is increased, but not social wealth.
At least in theory, it is possible that the losses to stakeholders could even
exceed the gains to shareholders. On a more abstract level, the implicit
contracting perspective produces an important paradigm shift, because
it moves the focus of the debate from the law’s usual concern with
reducing "agency costs" to the protection of the interests of these "stake-
holders" who are exposed to arguably opportunistic behavior by
shareholders.
Implications of the Implicit Contracting Perspective
The assertion that social and shareholder wealth are not positively
correlated is obviously subject to challenge. Because the opportunity
cost to an employee from being terminated is seldom, if ever, the em-
ployee’s full wage, it is difficult to believe that employee losses often
exceed shareholder gains. Still, the real significance of the implicit con-
tracting perspective is that it forces us to see the board of directors in a
very different light. While the law has traditionally viewed the board of
directors as the agent of the shareholders, this alternative perspective
suggests that the board’s role may be that of a mediator. Because long-
term contracting between shareholders and the other constituencies is
costly and numerous contingencies can arise that could not be foreseen
in advance, the parties to the implicit contract need a body to serve in
effect as an arbitration panel to preserve the fair expectations of each
side. On an ex ante basis, the parties designate the board to perform this
role through ex post adjustments (Coffee 1986). This view sounds hereti-
cal because, as we all know, only shareholders elect the board of direc-
tors, but in practice it is senior management who nominate candidates to
fill vacancies on the board, with shareholders only ratifying their selec-
tion. Thus, while in theory directors are elected by shareholders, in
reality the balance of power over their selection probably tilts in favor of
management.
This view of the board as a mediating body brings us back to the
distinctive character of the hostile takeover. Uniquely, it permits the
bidder to outflank the board. In contrast, a merger or sale of assets
generally requires board approval before it is submitted to shareholders.
Preempting the board’s role has special significance if we view this role
as that of a mediator entrusted by the various stakeholders with the task
of protecting the expectations of all the contracting parties and, argu-DISCUSSION 235
ably, also with a responsibility for allocating "windfall" gains, such as
takeover premiums. This view does not mean that defensive tactics are
therefore justifiable, but it does suggest a role for the board beyond that
of a bargaining agent for the shareholders; in particular, it invites criti-
cism of those Delaware decisions, such as Revlon, that see the board’s
role (at least once a takeover is inevitable) as only that of a "fair auction-
eer" (Coffee 1986, n. 225).
Predictably, some will respond that this view is overly idealized,
because there is little evidence to believe that the board has behaved in
the past as the wise, paternal, benign mediator that such a theory seems
to contemplate. But it is a mistake to see this mediation model of the
board’s role as equivalent to benevolent paternalism. Lower-echelon em-
ployees contract through other means and institutions (for example,
collective bargaining) and are not as exposed to opportunism because
they do not invest in much "firm-specific" capital or expect an ex post
"settling-up." The real contracting parties are chiefly managers and
shareholders.
The next step in this analysis explains the appearance of state take-
over statutes as the consequence ofthe preemption of the board’s role. If
the implicit contract has been breached, a contractual failure has argu-
ably occurred, and legal regulation becomes justifiable. In this perspec-
tive, state takeover statutes have nothing to do with shareholder
protection, but are instead aimed (albeit covertly) at managerial protec-
tion, because the old system of implicit contracting has failed.
To state these arguments is not necessarily to accept them. The first
hypothesis--the Free Cash Flow theory--probably has greater explana-
tory power, because the scale of recent takeover gains (roughly $167
.billion, according to Grundfest and Black 1987) cannot be explained sim-
ply on the basis of cost savings to shareholders from opportunistic
breaches of implicit contracts. This becomes clearer if we consider an
individual case. Today, the average takeover premium is around 40 per-
cent. One cannot generally explain a rational bidder paying $1.4 billion
for a target whose prior aggregate stock market value was $1 billion,
simply in terms of the cost savings that managerial layoffs are likely to
effect. Indeed, for such a takeover to be rational on this basis (given both
the risks and the notoriously high transaction costs), the bidder would
have to expect to realize cost savings considerably greater than this $400
million premium in order for it to earn a reasonable profit. There may
have been some takeovers that fit such a pattern, but even in these cases
the actual loss to the dismissed managers is their opportunity cost,
which will generally be only a fraction of their former salary.
Let us assume then that the disparity between stock and asset val-
ues of the typical target firm is attributable more to inefficient empire-
building and a bias for earnings retention than to shareholder236 John C. Coffee,
opportunism and the reneging on implicit contracts. Still, this view that
Free Cash Flow theory explains more (or even most) of the discount does
not refute the possibility that managers are exposed to significant losses
as a result of takeovers. Rather, it leads us to the critical issue, from my
perspective: If shareholders have more to gain from takeovers than man-
agers have to lose, why haven’t shareholders found ways to "bribe"
managers into acquiescence? This is, of course, what Coase’s theorem
would predict. The most obvious means by which to align managerial
incentives with those of the shareholders is through management com-
pensation formulas. Why then has private ordering not devised new
compensation formulas designed to secure managerial acquiescence in
takeovers?
Takeover Resistance as a Problem in Management
Compensation
Assume the Free Cash Flow formula is correct and managers are
biased toward retaining earnings in investments that have negative pres-
ent value once discounted at a rate equal to the corporation’s cost of
capital. Because such inefficient retention of earnings does not enrich
management personally, it can have only a limited utility for them. As-
sume that for each dollar of "free cash flow" that is inefficiently invested,
management receives a positive utility of 10 cents (because salaries are
positively correlated with size, or because there is greater psychic in-
come in managing a larger firm, or for some other reason). Seemingly, a
compensation formula could be devised that effectively paid managers
20 cents for each dollar of free cash flow not so invested, but instead paid
out. Why then hasn’t internal contracting within the firm fashioned such
a formula?
One answer may be that the failure to pay out free cash flow to
shareholders may have more to do with implicit contracting within the
firm than has hitherto been recognized. This answer may also explain
why target firms do not have more distinctive financial characteristics
(because the practice is widely prevalent). For example, risk-averse man-
agers might prefer the lower, but less risky, positive utility associated
with empire-building to the highly risky cash substitute that a compen-
sation formula offers.
Another answer may be that there are legal barriers that preclude
the adoption of more optimal management compensation formulas.
This answer has been tentatively put forward by Jensen and Murphy in
a recent, very interesting working paper, but it ultimately seems difficult
to accept, at least in the form in which they articulate it. They begin with
a striking fact: as they compute it, executive compensation is extremelyDISCUSSION 237
insensitive to the stock market performance of the firm employing the
manager, changing "less than two cents for every $1,000 change in equi-
ty value" (Jensei~ and Murphy 1987). If this is the case, it is little wonder
that managers have let stock market values sink below asset liquidation
values. Managers are essentially in the position of fixed-interest credi-
tors and, as such, should behave in a highly risk-averse fashion. This
leads to the next question: Why are management compensation prac-
tices so indifferent to the firm’s stock value? Here, Jensen and Murphy
suggest that fears of legal liability may lead directors to undercompen-
sate managers. This seems overstated, because cases imposing such li-
ability are notoriously lacking, and only in the case of twelfth-hour
"golden parachutes" or gratuitous pensions to the chairman’s widow
have courts intervened to enjoin the transaction.3 In general, the busi-
ness judgment rule reigns more supremely in this area than in most
others.
The problem may instead lie with the difficulty inherent in design-
ing the kind of management compensation formula that is needed (and
also with its relative novelty, which might subject it to a greater likeli-
hood that courts would enjoin it). Simply keying managers’ salaries to
the firm’s stock price is too crude, because it does not distinguish the
"firm-specific" component from the "systematic risk" component of the
stock price. Possible formulas that could make such a distinction may be
overly complicated and are not easily implemented, particularly if man-
agers are poor risk bearers and need a stable income stream. Also, if
some managers are risk-neutral, then stock-based compensation can
give rise to a moral hazard problem, as these managers would have an
incentive to accept highly risky investments and policies. The result
would begin to resemble a world in which the managers were selected
exclusively by the firm’s warrant holders. To sum up, one needs to steer
a fine line between Scylla and Charybdis: the former being the fact that
managers make poor risk bearers and the latter the danger of creating a
moral hazard problem.
More importantly, the higher we raise managers’ salaries, the more
we motivate them to resist a hostile takeover, by increasing their oppor-
tunity cost. Thus, while such a compensation formula might reduce the
incentive to retain free cash flow within the firm, it would motivate the
target’s management to resist a "synergistic" bidder who saw unique
gains from combining the bidder and~ target firms.
Still, other possible compensation formulas have not been ade-
quately explored. Consider then a very different form of compensation
formula, one patterned after the manner in which the law has historical-
3 See, for example, Adam v. Smith, 153 So. 2d 221 (Ala. 1963). Of special importance is
the fact that shareholder ratification shifts the burden to the plaintiff to prove waste. See
Saxe v. Brady, 184 A.2d 602 (Del. Ch. 1962). For a review of the case law, see Vagts (1983).238 John C. Coffee,
ly rewarded the successful plaintiff’s attorney in class or derivative ac-
tions: namely, a "percentage of the recovery" formula. This may sound
like a strange precedent to consider, but uniquely it gives the firm’s
managers an incentive both to. accept, and to maximize, the takeover
gains. Hypothetically, such a formula could be implemented by a provi-
sion in the corporate charter authorizing the board to pay to the firm’s
senior managers a specific percentage (say, 20 percent) of the premium
paid to shareholders in a merger, acquisition or tender offer; such pay-
ment would be made by the target corporation (not the bidder), and a
bylaw could commit the board to make such a payment, subject perhaps
to some limited circumstances where it could be voided in the judgment
of two-thirds of the board or more. This compensation would be in
addition to the salary and stock option compensation the managers were
otherwise paid. (Admittedly, a tendency to reduce regular compensation
in light of this contingent bonus might arise.)
What would be the incentive effects of such a system? In a more
focused manner than stock options, such a form of compensation
should encourage target managers not only to acquiesce in a takeover,
but to seek out bidders and conduct legitimate value-maximizing auc-
tions. To be sure, some managers might still resist, but particularly for
the CEO nearing retirement age, the lure of such a bonus should be
considerable. Nor is this compensation costly to shareholders of firms
for which no offer is made (as stock options and bonuses are).
Would there be any perverse incentives? Here, any answer must be
qualified. Because such a compensation system gives the manager an
interest in maximizing the margin between the firm’s stock value and its
higher break-up value, there could conceivably be an incentive to mis-
manage the firm in order to maximize this spread. This possibility seems
small. A decline in corporate earnings would likely affect the manager’s
ordinary compensation (by reducing bonus income or the value of stock
options) and would expose the manager to the threat of ouster by the
board. In addition, the truly inefficient, mismanaged firm seems to es-
cape the hostile takeover (witness the success of International Harvester,
Chrysler, Continental Illinois and others in this regard), possibly be-
cause the bidder fears that it will be acquiring a "turkey" with more
intractable problems than it realizes from the outside. Corporate culture
is another factor that makes deliberate mismanagement an unlikely
scenario.
A more realistic possibility is that such a compensation formula
would give management an incentive to withhold favorable information
from the stock market in order to privately reveal it only to selected
bidders. Again, this conduct would maximize the spread between the
stock market and break-up values, but it would not lead to any penalty
in terms of reduced current earnings (because salary tends to be basedDISCUSSION 239
on historical reported earnings, not future discounted cash flows). Of
course, to the extent one believes in the efficiency of the stock market,
the ability of management to conceal material information from the mar-
ket (while revealing it selectively to potential bidders) seems limited.
Bidders who learn such information will logically buy the stock in the
open market, and insider trading and normal information leakage may
also close the gap between the two values. Thus, although there is the
possibility of allocative inefficiency caused by managerial concealment of
material information, the magnitude of this problem seems small.
The real problems with this proposal are, first, that it is open-ended,
and, second, that it does not benefit all those who, if we believe that
implicit contracts have been breached, stand to lose unfairly. The con-
cept of a percentage-of-the-recovery fee award, as used in class actions,
was always subject to a judicial scrutiny for reasonableness, and fee
awards over 40 percent of the recovery have been extremely rare. Thus,
although it may be in the shareholders’ interest to allocate on an ex ante
basis 10 or even 20 percent of the takeover premium to managers who
are otherwise in a position to block it, a 50 percent allocation seems
unreasonable. How likely is such a result? Much depends on how much
confidence we place in the charter amendment process, where collective
action problems and high information costs may make shareholders ra-
tionally apathetic. The more we doubt this process, the more we may be
legitimizing extortion by managers of the takeover premium. Yet, corpo-
rate control transactions may be the unique context where investors do
pay close attention to proposed charter amendments, because the ex-
pected gains are large enough to overcome their rational apathy.
Second, if we believe that takeovers invite shareholder opportunism
and reneging on implicit contracts, this proposal represents only a par-
tial answer, because it does not necessarily benefit middle management
or others. The tension here is obvious: the more senior management
shares that portion of the premium allocated to management with mid-
dle levels, the less will be senior management’s expected return and the
more it is still likely to oppose a takeover. The difficulty of this trade-off
and the arguable need for a ceiling on the maximum amount so allo-
cable suggests the need for legislative limits, possibly including non-
discrimination rules paralleling the statutory provisions regulating pen-
sion plans.
Regardless of these specific and subsidiary questions, the sharing of
takeover gains that I am here suggesting goes well beyond any use that
has yet been made of golden parachutes. Even in the more "liberal" cases
upholding such compensation, courts have looked to the predictable
loss in compensation over, typically, a three-year period and have adopt-
ed a "reasonableness" test.4 Under such a test, a decision by the board
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unlikely to pass such a test, absent special factors.
However, if such a provision were inserted in the corporate charter
by a shareholder vote well in advance of any takeover, its prospect for
judicial approval seems materially enhanced (although still not certain).
The case for it now is not that it is "reasonable" in judicial eyes but that it
was approved by a disinterested majority of shareholders (and possibly
ratified within some reasonable "sunset" period). Only if the plaintiffs
could demonstrate "waste" (a legally vague term approaching sheer irra-
tionality) would such a provision be invalid under the Delaware case
law.
To implement such a provision, changes in the federal tax laws will
probably also be necessary, because "change of control" executive com-
pensation is today subject to special and punitive taxation. Hence, feder-
al tax reform is a precondition to any policy of securing managerial
acquiescence.
Conclusion
Because of the CTS decision and the adoption of antitakeover stat-
utes by a majority of the states, takeovers may yet be sharply curtailed.
This prediction has proven false before, but rarely has the coalition of
forces opposed to takeovers seemed so organized as today, when they
have succeeded in a majority of the states in enacting legislation. The
political economy of these statutes is particularly interesting. Despite
their overt purpose, it takes little analysis to conclude that state takeover
statutes do not benefit target shareholders. Target corporations could
adopt--and to a considerable extent have adopted--charter provisions
protecting their shareholders against the coercive features of partial bids
and two-tier tender offers. Even in the absence of shareholder approval,
boards of directors can adopt "poison pill" plans that can have a similar
effect. There is thus little need for legislative efforts to protect the target
shareholder, who may already be overprotected in most instances, even
without governmental regulation.
But the fact that such legislation does not really help its nominal
beneficiaries does not mean that there are not covert beneficiaries. Target
managements, local communities, suppliers, existing creditors--all fall
into this latter category. Takeover legislation, particularly at the state
level, has usually amounted to a form of rent-seeking by such groups,
and they have been highly effective because they are a politically cohe-
sive and visible local force, while shareholders are dispersed nationally;
4 See Koenings v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 377 N.W.2d 593 (Wisc. 1985); (issue is the
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bidders and their allies can also be pejoratively dismissed as "arbitragers
and speculators."
Against this backdrop of contending forces engaged in a rent-
seeking competition investment bankers on one side and the corporate
business community largely on the other--only an incurable optimist
would predict a satisfactory legislative solution. Stalemate and piece-
meal compromise seem more likely. From an economic perspective,
however, we can witness a familiar story in a new context: instead of
railroads and cornfields, we here see shareholders and managers locked
in the familiar Coasean attempt to negotiate an efficient outcome. The
gains to the shareholders seem to outweigh the losses to the managers,
and thus the possibility of an efficient outcome is discernible if legal
barriers can be relaxed that might prevent a mutually beneficially trans-
action. If not, I expect that the takeover boom of recent years will gradu-
ally turn into a leveraged buyout boom, as target managements find this
option to be their exclusive means of protecting their economic position.
Most likely, the alternatives for the future are either new systems of
managerial compensation that give managers greater incentive to accept
risk or a higher rate of management buyouts, as managers acquire a
controlling position in order to assure their tenure in office.
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